#63 README: explain the TRUST_PROXY effect on anonymous visitors
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- github
- github/openchronology/timeline-app
- github/openchronology/timeline-app#63
- pull request
- state:merged
Adds a paragraph to the README's PostgreSQL deployment section, next to the reverse-proxy setup. Under Next.js the server can't see the connecting address (`server/next-handler.mjs` passes `remoteAddress: 'unknown'`). Without `TRUST_PROXY=1`, every request therefore shares one address, and the per-address limits (about 10 a minute) apply to everyone at once: - password sign-in and registration - social and desktop sign-in starts - email verification and password-reset links - two-factor completion - guests loading or copying a public timeline (`browser-fork`) - SQLite downloads, which are keyed by address even for signed-in users The paragraph also repeats when it is safe to enable: the proxy overwrites `X-Forwarded-For` with one client address, and the app port isn't directly reachable. Docs only. #62 adds one more effect (sign-in checks for everyone after three failures), which is documented in that PR's `docs/authentication.md`. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ti36soiZpKdSxKfvQLEcfY https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/pull/63
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Open #63 README: explain the TRUST_PROXY effect on anonymous visitors in the timeline