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openchronology/timeline-app on GitHub

The OpenChronology repository on GitHub, mirrored by och-import-github: issues and pull requests as durations (ongoing while open), what happened to them as moments, plus releases, milestones, commits and branches. The Branches view shows the most recently active branches each in a track of its own.

Source: https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app

3,131 moments · 2026-10-05 CE 20:21:49 UTC – 2026-11-16 CE 12:10:45 UTC · by @athan · @athan

#507 Security hardening: the desktop page can make the app touch any local path

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  • github
  • github/openchronology/timeline-app
  • github/openchronology/timeline-app#507
  • issue
  • state:closed

**The page can make Rust touch any local path (file-existence oracle, image reads anywhere, automount triggers)** - **Severity:** Informational. This matters only together with script execution in the webview, or as a privacy and network-touch side effect. - **Location:** `src-tauri/src/main.rs:484-527` (`desktop_open_file`, `desktop_thumbnails`, `desktop_reveal_file` take any `file:` URL from the page), `src-tauri/src/thumbnails.rs:34-39`, `src-tauri/src/populate.rs:504-515`. - **Description:** The populator follows the invariant "the page never names a path", but these three commands do not. `local_path` correctly refuses remote hosts, and on Windows `to_file_path` only yields drive-letter paths, so there is no UNC or NTLM. Still, `canonicalize` and `metadata` run on whatever path a timeline names, and every photo or video the user can read anywhere on disk is decoded into a `data:` URL for the page. On macOS the default `/net` automount (`-hosts`) means a link such as `file:///net/attacker.example/x/a.jpg` makes the system contact that host. Today the page cannot exfiltrate the thumbnails: the CSP blocks fetch, and DOM-built rendering gave no XSS sink. Any future XSS, however, could read all the user's pictures through `img-src https:` beacons. - **Suggested fix:** Limit these commands to paths under folders picked in a native dialog, or to timelines the user trusted (see finding 2). - **Confidence:** Confirmed for the behaviour. The macOS `/net` effect is possible and untested. --- From the security review of 2026-11-06 (commit 6776c44), finding I-6: hardening or information, filed publicly because it describes no way in. The exploitable findings are private security advisories. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_011fFY8eruEi1xAkkMBni13B https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/issues/507

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Open #507 Security hardening: the desktop page can make the app touch any local path in the timeline

#507 Security hardening: the desktop page can make the app…