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openchronology/timeline-app on GitHub

The OpenChronology repository on GitHub, mirrored by och-import-github: issues and pull requests as durations (ongoing while open), what happened to them as moments, plus releases, milestones, commits and branches. The Branches view shows the most recently active branches each in a track of its own.

Source: https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app

3,131 moments · 2026-10-05 CE 20:21:49 UTC – 2026-11-16 CE 12:10:45 UTC · by @athan · @athan

#502 Security hardening: sign releases and publish provenance, not only SHA256SUMS

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  • github
  • github/openchronology/timeline-app
  • github/openchronology/timeline-app#502
  • issue
  • state:closed

**Release artifacts have no signatures or provenance; trust rests on the GitHub release alone** - **Severity: Low.** No exploit is needed against users, but compromising the GitHub account, a maintainer token or the `contents: write` release job is enough to swap the packages and SHA256SUMS together, and downstream channels re-derive their checksums from those assets. - **Affected:** every release asset (.deb, .rpm, FreeBSD .pkg, Windows .exe, desktop .deb/.rpm/AppImage/.dmg/.exe, the offline HTML), the Homebrew tap and the AUR packages. - **Location:** - scripts/release-assets.mjs:4 and 38-46 write SHA256SUMS.txt only. - release.yml:91-106 uploads with `--clobber`. - release.yml:129-133 and 177-185: the Homebrew formula and AUR PKGBUILDs take their sha256 from the asset just downloaded from the same release (scripts/aur-packages.mjs:63-67, 99). The AUR pgmp checksum is computed from a fresh download at release time (aur-packages.mjs:63), not pinned as deploy/windows-server/pgmp.sha256 is. - README.md:308: "Windows installers and macOS applications are currently unsigned (macOS is not notarized)". - **Description:** There is no GPG or minisign signature, no Sigstore or `actions/attest-build-provenance`, and no signed apt/dnf repository, so users install .deb/.rpm files by hand with no signature check. The desktop app has no updater (no tauri-plugin-updater; src-tauri/tauri.conf.json has no `updater` or `pubkey`), so there is no updater key to steal but also no authenticated update channel. The checksums only detect transport corruption. - **Attack scenario:** - Precondition: someone with release write access, or a malicious maintainer token. - Steps: re-upload trojaned assets with `--clobber` and a matching SHA256SUMS, then re-run the release so the Homebrew and AUR jobs publish the new hashes. - Impact: code execution as root through postinst on every server that upgrades. - **What defends against it today:** actions are SHA-pinned, the publish job alone has `contents: write`, and secrets reach only tag and release runs. Checksums detect mirror corruption. - **Suggested fix:** Add `actions/attest-build-provenance` (needs `id-token: write`, `attestations: write`) for each asset, and sign SHA256SUMS with a key kept outside GitHub, or with Sigstore cosign keyless signing. Pin the pgmp tarball sha256 in the repo for AUR, as Windows and Nix already do. Authenticode-sign the Windows installers and notarize the macOS apps once certificates exist (already noted in the README). Consider tag protection rules for `v*`. - **Confidence:** confirmed. --- From the security review of 2026-11-06 (commit 6776c44), finding L-16: hardening or information, filed publicly because it describes no way in. The exploitable findings are private security advisories. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_011fFY8eruEi1xAkkMBni13B https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/issues/502

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Open #502 Security hardening: sign releases and publish provenance, not only SHA256SUMS in the timeline

#502 Security hardening: sign releases and publish…