#502 Security hardening: sign releases and publish provenance, not only SHA256SUMS
–
- github
- github/openchronology/timeline-app
- github/openchronology/timeline-app#502
- issue
- state:closed
**Release artifacts have no signatures or provenance; trust rests on the GitHub release alone** - **Severity: Low.** No exploit is needed against users, but compromising the GitHub account, a maintainer token or the `contents: write` release job is enough to swap the packages and SHA256SUMS together, and downstream channels re-derive their checksums from those assets. - **Affected:** every release asset (.deb, .rpm, FreeBSD .pkg, Windows .exe, desktop .deb/.rpm/AppImage/.dmg/.exe, the offline HTML), the Homebrew tap and the AUR packages. - **Location:** - scripts/release-assets.mjs:4 and 38-46 write SHA256SUMS.txt only. - release.yml:91-106 uploads with `--clobber`. - release.yml:129-133 and 177-185: the Homebrew formula and AUR PKGBUILDs take their sha256 from the asset just downloaded from the same release (scripts/aur-packages.mjs:63-67, 99). The AUR pgmp checksum is computed from a fresh download at release time (aur-packages.mjs:63), not pinned as deploy/windows-server/pgmp.sha256 is. - README.md:308: "Windows installers and macOS applications are currently unsigned (macOS is not notarized)". - **Description:** There is no GPG or minisign signature, no Sigstore or `actions/attest-build-provenance`, and no signed apt/dnf repository, so users install .deb/.rpm files by hand with no signature check. The desktop app has no updater (no tauri-plugin-updater; src-tauri/tauri.conf.json has no `updater` or `pubkey`), so there is no updater key to steal but also no authenticated update channel. The checksums only detect transport corruption. - **Attack scenario:** - Precondition: someone with release write access, or a malicious maintainer token. - Steps: re-upload trojaned assets with `--clobber` and a matching SHA256SUMS, then re-run the release so the Homebrew and AUR jobs publish the new hashes. - Impact: code execution as root through postinst on every server that upgrades. - **What defends against it today:** actions are SHA-pinned, the publish job alone has `contents: write`, and secrets reach only tag and release runs. Checksums detect mirror corruption. - **Suggested fix:** Add `actions/attest-build-provenance` (needs `id-token: write`, `attestations: write`) for each asset, and sign SHA256SUMS with a key kept outside GitHub, or with Sigstore cosign keyless signing. Pin the pgmp tarball sha256 in the repo for AUR, as Windows and Nix already do. Authenticode-sign the Windows installers and notarize the macOS apps once certificates exist (already noted in the README). Consider tag protection rules for `v*`. - **Confidence:** confirmed. --- From the security review of 2026-11-06 (commit 6776c44), finding L-16: hardening or information, filed publicly because it describes no way in. The exploitable findings are private security advisories. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_011fFY8eruEi1xAkkMBni13B https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/issues/502