#501 Security hardening: every OpenChronology service shares one Unix account and its secrets
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- github
- github/openchronology/timeline-app
- github/openchronology/timeline-app#501
- issue
- state:closed
**All services share one Unix account, so a compromise of any of them reaches every secret and the journal group** - **Severity: Low.** This is defense in depth and needs code execution in one service first. It widens the reach of two network-facing parsers (the web server and the syslog receiver). - **Affected:** Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, Rocky and Arch (systemd units), FreeBSD (rc scripts), NixOS module. - **Location:** - deploy/debian-server/openchronology.service:10-13. - openchronology-syslog.service:10-12, which runs as `User=openchronology` with its own syslog.env. - openchronology-journald.service:10-14, which adds `SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal`. - deploy/debian-server/journald.env:20-21 (rendered in the env template at lines 211-214), where the SSH key is "readable by the openchronology user". - postinst:24 and 35-40 (`/etc/openchronology` 0750 root:openchronology, files 0640). - nix/module.nix:60-64 and 306. - **Description:** The web server, mail worker, syslog receiver (unauthenticated UDP/TCP parser) and journald follower all run as the same UID. Each env file is readable by that UID, so each process can read the others' secrets: - openchronology.env: DATABASE_URL, AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY, RESEND_API_KEY, OAuth secrets, LDAP bind password, S3 keys, ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD. - syslog.env and journald.env: OCH_API_KEY. - The journald SSH private key. The journald follower also holds `systemd-journal`. With the same UID, and Yama `ptrace_scope=0` (Debian's default), the web process can ptrace or write `/proc/ /mem` of the follower and act with that group. - **Attack scenario:** - Precondition: code execution in the syslog receiver, for example through a parser bug reached over UDP from any host that can send to it. - Steps: read /etc/openchronology/openchronology.env, then use DATABASE_URL (peer authentication as the same UID), AUTH_ENCRYPTION_KEY and the Resend key. - Alternatively, from the web server: read journald_ssh_key and log into the remote log host, or inject into the journald follower and read the whole system journal. - Impact: full platform compromise from the log receiver, and lateral movement to the remote log host. - **What defends against it today:** the units use NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict and ProtectHome. The receivers listen on loopback by default (syslog-receiver.mjs:137; syslog.env SYSLOG_HOST=127.0.0.1). - **Suggested fix:** Run the syslog and journald units with `DynamicUser=yes`, or as separate users (`openchronology-syslog`, `openchronology-journald`), each able to read only its own env file and key. Give each unit only the env file it needs (for example 0640 root:openchronology-syslog). Add `ProtectProc=invisible`, or at least `PrivateUsers=`, to the workers. - **Confidence:** confirmed for file access. The ptrace path is likely and depends on the host's Yama setting. --- From the security review of 2026-11-06 (commit 6776c44), finding L-14: hardening or information, filed publicly because it describes no way in. The exploitable findings are private security advisories. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_011fFY8eruEi1xAkkMBni13B https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/issues/501
Related
- #527 Harden packaging and deployment: Windows folders, database roles, provenance, services
- #530 Run the log receivers as their own user, openchronology-logs (#501)
- Log importers: their own system user, openchronology-logs (#501)
- NixOS: the log importers as openchronology-logs, with their own secrets (#501)
- Merge pull request #530 from openchronology/security/log-receivers-own-user