#499 Security hardening: Docker Compose and Homebrew connect the app to PostgreSQL as a superuser
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- github
- github/openchronology/timeline-app
- github/openchronology/timeline-app#499
- issue
- state:closed
**Docker Compose (and Homebrew): the web application connects to PostgreSQL as a superuser** - **Severity: Low.** This is defense in depth. It needs a separate application bug, such as SQL injection, but it turns that bug into full control of the database and command execution. - **Affected:** Docker Compose (compose.yml); Homebrew (deploy/homebrew). - **Location:** - compose.yml:10-15, where `PGUSER: openchronology` is shared by migrate, app and mail-worker. - compose.yml:24-26, where `POSTGRES_USER: openchronology` makes this the superuser in the official postgres image. - server/schema.sql:30 (`CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgmp`), which is why the migrating role must be superuser. - deploy/homebrew/openchronology-setup:37, where `DATABASE_URL=postgresql://$user@/openchronology?host=/tmp` uses the Homebrew user, the cluster's superuser. - **Description:** The Debian, RPM, Arch, FreeBSD, Windows and NixOS deployments split roles. The superuser (`postgres`) creates pgmp once, and the server runs as a non-superuser owner role (postinst:114-121, module.nix:253-256). Compose instead uses one role for everything, and that role is the container's bootstrap superuser. Homebrew does the same with the user's own superuser account. Homebrew's own `initdb` also uses `trust` authentication for local and 127.0.0.1 connections; that is Homebrew's default, not this project's. On a multi-user Mac, any local user can therefore connect as that superuser. - **Attack scenario:** - Precondition: any SQL-injection or query-construction bug in the server, or a stolen DATABASE_URL. - Steps: `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` or `pg_read_server_files`, then a shell as `postgres` in the database container. From there, `ALTER SYSTEM` and reading or changing every database. - Impact: database takeover and code execution in the db container. On Homebrew, code execution as the macOS user, and access to every other database in that user's cluster. - **Evidence:** the lines above. The official postgres image documents that `POSTGRES_USER` is created with superuser power. - **What defends against it today:** the database container publishes no ports (compose.yml:18-33). The app container runs as `node`. - **Suggested fix:** In Compose, keep `POSTGRES_USER` as the bootstrap superuser, which `migrate` uses to `CREATE EXTENSION pgmp`. Add an init script in `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` that creates a separate non-superuser `openchronology_app` role owning the database, and give the `app` and `mail-worker` services that role's credentials. For Homebrew, create a dedicated non-superuser role in openchronology-setup and use it in DATABASE_URL. - **Confidence:** confirmed for Compose. Homebrew is confirmed for the role; the trust-auth part depends on Homebrew's initdb defaults. --- From the security review of 2026-11-06 (commit 6776c44), finding L-13: hardening or information, filed publicly because it describes no way in. The exploitable findings are private security advisories. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_011fFY8eruEi1xAkkMBni13B https://github.com/openchronology/timeline-app/issues/499